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 "Your magnificent performance, your first battle, has materially shortened the road that leads to Victory."

General Harry L. Twaddle, commander of the 95th Infantry Division

Northern France    Rhineland    Ardennes-Alsace    Central Europe

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  The Battles

  The bridgehead at Uckange

  The Chateau Brieux

  The liberation of Woippy

  The Bridge of the Savage

  The South-Western Forts of Metz


  The newspapers of the battle for Metz

The bridgegead at Uckange - Operation Casanova
Date : From 8 To 14 November 1944
Location of the action : Uckange, France
Unit in the area : 1st Battalion, 377th Inf. Reg.

 

Above : First's crossing at Uckange was made in boats like this one; it's a training shot of the 377th Infantry Regiment making assault crossing. 

  A la mi-Novembre 1944, le projet de réaliser un véritable franchissement à Thionville était planifié, mais il fallait persuader les Allemands que le franchissement aurait lieu au Sud de Thionville. Le besoin de créer une autre tête de pont faisant "diversion", était demandée. L'unité désignée pour cette mission nommée "Opération Casanova" était le 1st Battalion du 377th Infantry Regiment tandis que les deux autres unités de la Division, le 378th et le 379th Infantry Regiment, contiennent le saillant fortifié occidental autour de Metz. Le rapport de la mission spécifie que l'attaque sera menée le 8 Novembre, soit un jour avant que le XXth Corps ne se mette en route. Ainsi, le premier sang versé dans la bataille finale de Metz sera versé par les "nouveaux gars" de la 95th Infantry Division.

  The 1st Battalion was chosen to make the river crossing, and after the move from the southern bridgegead, they were transferred to the riverbank in the Uckange area. All 95th Division markings were removed, fake message traffic was maintained and they disguised themselves as the 359th Infantry Regiment, by then on the north toward Aumetz. Their mission was to cross the Moselle, move across the flood plain on the far side and occupy the small town of Immeldange astride the main north-south road between Metz and Sierck-lès-Bains. There they were to dig in and wait to be relieved by troops moving down from the main crossing site.

Above : Map of the operation Casanova

(from 8 to 14 November 1944).

  The appalling weather conditions precluded the planned preliminary air attack on the enemy on the far bank, but an artillery concentration was fired. At dusk, a company of the 320th Combat Engineer Battalion slipped across the river, detonated mines, and blew a gap through the barbed wire. At 2100,  Company C of the 377th Infantry Regiment paddled across in 17 assault boats, a distance of some 200 yards. Once over they met with no immediate opposition as the German were entrenched further back along the line of the main road, and the 73rd Regiment of the 19 VG Division required some time to react. This is surprising because the activities of the engineers must have made a tremendous racket.

  The small group of infantry advanced some 400 yards across the featureless floddplain and then dug in to await daylight. It was then that enemy artillery homed in on them, as they were well within range of the concentration of guns that had been amassed to counter the earlier attacks on Maizières-lès-Metz. However, most of the shells fell behind Company C, on the crossing site where the engineers were frantically trying to construct a footbridge. On account of the shelling, this had to be abandoned, and Company A was ferried over in the early hours of 9 November. By then, however, the weather had begun to exert its baneful influence. During the previous night the river had started to flood, fed by the torrential rain, and by the morning had burst its banks. The turbulent waters had spread out over the flood plain, doubling the normal width of the river and vastly increasing the speed of the current. The approach road to the crossing site disappeared under the water and all efforts to get a telephone line across were frustrated by the current. Thus the only means of communication were via a frail radio link.

  By daybreak on 9 November, the 1st Battalion had two rifle companies and a heavy weapons platoon across the swirling river. They then began to move off further inland, bypassed the village of Bertrange and established themselves on a low hill to the east, out of reach of the spreading water. Although not directly menaced by enemy infantry, shelling and mortar fire were heavy and the men dug in to keep warm. At 0905, the batallion reported hack to Regimental HQ : "Two companies are across river. River is very high and we're not sending others over".

 

Above : Sketched by PFC Ernest. L. Deal of Company A, we can see the dropping of rations and small arms ammunition from artillery liaison planes. 

The flood waters frustrated all attempts to supply the two companies, who were by then entirely cut off. The speed of the current and accurate enemy shelling made daylight movement across the Moselle more or less impossible, even when outboard motors were attached to the assault boats. It was therefore decided to try air supply by artillery spotter aircraft. Ten L-4's flew throughout the afternoon, each with a "dropper" who had volunteered to squat behind the pilot. Flying at only 25 feet, they managed to deliver 1080 K-rations, 46000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 4000 rounds of 50-caliber ammunition, medical supplies, cigarettes, water purification tablets, plasma, and even a sack of toilet paper. The drops were certainly accurate, and a platton leader said: "We got all the rations we needed from the planes." Major Neumann, who flew several missions, reported that he "coukd seee some of our men standing in water in their foxholes. They waved and shouted when we dropped some rations right down next to the foxhole." This was the first of several occasions during the Battle of Metz when such light aircraft were used for resupply missions to isolated troops.

 

These exceptional photographs show the men incorporated in the artillery liaison planes of the Division. Among them, some men did a great job during the bridgehead of Uckange and delivered ammunition, rations and medical supplies by air.

On the left : Pilots et observers in front of a L-4.

Below : Ground crew : mechanics, radiomen, first aid men, cooks.

  An indication that gentlemanly conduct could still prevail was provided when a boatload of medical personnel, displaying the Red Cross, tried to get over the River. Dragged away by the current, they were met on the far bank by two German soldiers, who emerged from a dugout. In good English the medics were told that they were in the wrong place and were directed further downstream. Somewhat puzzled and suspicious, they managed to return to their starting point where they were redirected by the battalion commander. Setting off for another attemps, they crossed the river and paddled on across the flood plain until they arrived at the outskirts of Bertrange. There, a German officer appeared and told them : "No American troops here. We are taking care of one wounded American. Your troops? Up there." He then redirected them to where the American were dug in.

  On 10 November, in spite of the danger from icing on the wings, further supply missions were flown. There was worry about dropping mortar rounds as it was feared that they would go off on inpact. As an experiment, an aircraft flew over German-held Bertrange and dropped several rounds on the human guinea pigs below. Not observing any explosions, the pilots assumed that it was safe to drop the rounds on their own men.

  During the night of 11 and 12 November, the flood waters began to recede, and the following night it proved possible to ferry across the remainder of the battalion. This was undertaken without loss, as the engineers carried out a feint crossing by running their outboard motors, to distract the German artillery observers.

  The operation of the Uckange bridgehead failed to tie down any significant numbers of German reserves. The main attack which started on the following day was immediatly recognized to be the more important thrust. Thus the point of the deception was lost. The 19 Volksgrenadier Division did not have any reserves to commit anyway and would soon have realized that only small numbers of Americans were involved. By then, the German had identified the 10th Armored Division north of Thionville and had observed the buildup of bridging equipment in this area.

  During this time, the 2nd Battalion of the 378th Infantry Division commanded by Colonel Maroun, did a real bridgehead in Thionville, received the order to gather the Battalion plus some tanks and tank destroyers, and attack southward to relieve the defenders in the Uckange bridgehead.

  During the morning of 13 November, 1st Battalion was ordered by the 95th Infantry Division to move off to the north, bypass Bertrange and Immeldange and capture Illange where they would link up with Colonel Maroun's men. The mens of this battalion took the two former town without difficulties, but as they regroupped prior to moving off, they were struck by a task force from the 73rg Grenadier Regiment, supported by some antitank guns. The forces in the two towns became separated and went to ground as the Germans roared up and down the long main streets in armored personnel carriers shooting at anything that moved. Communication with their artillery on the west bank broke down.

  It was only restored early in the morning of 14 november, with a First Sergeant of the Company A acting as forward observer. However, in spite of the usually effective American artillery response, the Germans were not easily discouraged. They pressed their attacks all day, supported by light armored vehicles, to such an extent that at 2200, the battalion commander reported that his mission was "desperate". One must remember that the 1st Battalion men were armed only with the weapons that they could carry and had been in action nonstop since the evening of 8 November.

  During the evening, communications again broke down, and on the morning of 15 November, the remainder of the battalion was still holding out in the gutted ruins of the two villages. Bacon's force arrived just in the nick of time, but during his advance, and using his tank destroyers as self-propelled artillery, Colonel Bacon shelled the Germans out of Bertrange and Immeldande, and by 1300, the beleaguered forces were relieved. Their strength, however, had been reduced to a mere handful of officers and men, but instead of being sent into reserve, they immediatly became a part of Task Force Bacon.

  At 2345, November 15, Colonel Bacon, reported the following strength figures for the rifle comanies of the 1st Battalion. (It will be remebered that the normal strength of a rifle company is over 180 men.)

Company A : 1 officer and 42 enlisted men

Company B : 1 officer and 39 enlisted men

Company C : 4 officers and 107 enlisted men.

  The figures speak for themselves on the price the 1st Battalion had paid for Operation Casanova. The results were less tangible, but it is clear that the 1st batallion had made a contribution to the overall success of the Metz operation. They had drawn a large percentage of German artillery fire to Uckange area, and thus made easier the crossing of the 90th Infantry Division at Koenigsmacker and of the 2nd Battalion of the 378th Infantry Regiment at Thionville. In addition, they had forced the Germans to expend armor and infantry in a futile attempt to wipe out the Uckange bridgehead. They had held their ground against this counterattack and on November 16 they pushed aggressively south with Task Force Bacon and were to play an important part in the final assault on Metz.